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SECURITIES-SUFFICIBNCY OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIPTION AND 
hs RELATION TO THE NoTicE PROVIDED BY A REcoRDED CHATTEL 
MORTGAGE-The great number of decisions which deal with descrip-
tions of property in chattel mortgages may have resulted in a clarifica-
1954] COMMENTS 119 
tion of the applicable law. Such continuous litigation, however, would 
seem to indicate that either the law has not yet provided a satisfactory 
solution to the description problem or that the real difficulty lies out-
side the area of description. If the controversy is between the mortgagor 
and the mortgagee the problems are relatively few, but when persons 
who were not original parties to the mortgage enter the picture, the 
mobility and lack of unique features which are characteristic of most 
chattels have caused problems that call for investigation, analysis and 
possibly a revision of the present law. From the mortgagor's point of 
view a distinguishing and desirable feature of the chattel mortgage is 
that he may either retain or obtain possession of the mortgaged prop-
erty. Chattel mortgage recording acts have been used to dispel infer-
ences of fraud which may appear in such a situation.1 For the acts to 
be effective a recorded mortgage should apprise any interested person 
of the mortgagee's security interest. On the other hand the matter of 
primary concern to the mortgagee is what he must do to preserve the 
security provided by the mortgage. The mortgage of machinery or 
household goods is illustrative of the general type of situation to be 
discussed and no attempt will be made to consider the special problems 
involved in the mortgage of automobiles2 or to treat the conflicts of 
laws issues raised by the movement of mortgaged chattels across state 
lines. The primary aims of this comment are to point out what the law 
requires in the nature of description, to analyze the value of these 
requirements in the light of the recording acts, to examine possible 
alternative security devices, and to suggest some useful steps that may 
be taken to augment the present system. 
I. The Legal Requirements 
A. Validity as between the Mortgagor and Mortgagee. While the 
expression of a theoretical basis is seldom found in the judicial opin-
ions, it is generally held that a chattel mortgage, absent other defects, 
is valid if the description is such that the property intended to be mort-
gaged can be identified.3 Parol evidence is admissible to show the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of the mortgage as evidence of intent 
and to aid otherwise in identifying the mortgaged property.4 Theoreti-
11 DURFEB, CASES ON SECURI'lY 489-492 (1951). 
2 For a review of the peculiar problems of automobile mortgages see 25 IND. L.J. 337 
(1950); 33 MARQ. L. RBv. 54 (1949); 16 Mo. L. REv. 156 (1951). 
3 Mott v. Johnson, 112 Wash. 18, 191 P. 844 (1920); Robson v. Maloney, 42 Wash. 
(2d) 874, 259 P. (2d) 836 (1953). 
4£rich v. Dunl<ly, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 345, 179 P. (2d) 638 (1947); 1 JoNEs, 
CHA'ITEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES 94 (1933). 
120 MmmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
cally this rule can be explained in a "title" state by analogy to the 
princip~e of property law that a conveyance which does not adequately 
identify the property to be conveyed is void.5 In a "lien" state it would 
seem that a consensual lien is created only when the description, a 
term of the mortgage contract, is sufficiently definite to be capable of 
legal enforcement.6 Thus the general rule is explainable under either 
theory of chattel mortgages and seems relatively free from objection in 
its practical application. 
B. The Requirement of Notice to Third Parties. When ques-
tions arise involving persons who were not parties to the mortgage, the 
inquiry shifts from the validity of the mortgage to the sufficiency of 
notice which the mortgage will supply to non-parties once it is recorded. 
Without distinguishing between purchasers from the mortgagor,7 pur-
chasers at a foreclosure sale, 8 persons claiming by virtue of an execu-
tion,0 or other mortgagees,1° the almost universal starting point of the 
courts in these cases is that the description must suggest reasonable 
inquiries, which, when pursued, will lead to an identification of the 
mortgaged property.11 While parol evidence may be admitted to aid 
in identifying a chattel as that which was intended to be mortgaged, 
it is not admissible to supply omissions in the written mortgage once 
recorded.12 Beyond the general rule as stated, the cases do not contain 
many factual similarities. However, the courts have indicated that the 
inclusion of certain information in the description, viz., ownership, 
location or possession of the property at the time of the mortgage will 
5 4 TIFFANY, REAL ·PROPERTY, 3d ed., §990 (1939). 
61 WILLISTON, CoNTRA.crrs, rev. ed., §24 (1936); 1 ConnIN, CoNTRAcrrs §100 
(1950). To the effect that contract principles are applicable to description problems in 
chattel mortgages see Raeuber v. Central Nat. Bank, (D.C. Ohio 1953) 112 F. Supp. 865. 
7 Huse v. Estabrooks, 67 Vt. 223, 31 A. 293 (1894); Scoggan v. Dillion, (Ky. 1952) 
252 S.W. (2d) 35; Neece v. Guerin, 210 Ark. 954, 198 S.W. (2d) 161 (1946); Tragar 
v. Jackson, 230 Minn. 544, 42 N.W. (2d) 16 (1950). 
8 Shellhammer v. Jones, 87 Iowa 520, 54 N.W. 363 (1893). 
9 The Westinghouse Co. v. McGrath, 131 Iowa 226, 108 N.W. 449 (1906); Trinity 
State Bank v. Bowie Contracting Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 232 S.W. (2d) 863; 
McFerrin v. Clarksville Wood Industries, 217 Ark. 383, 230 S.W. (2d) 49 (1950). 
lOPreston v. Caul, 109 Iowa 443, 80 N.W. 522 (1899); Sims v. McFadden, 217 
Ark. 810, 233 S.W. (2d) 375 (1950); Mathews v. Couie, (La. App. 1948) 35 S. (2d) 
794. 
111 JoNEs, CHATrEL MoRTGAGEs AND CoNDITIONAL SALES §54 (1933); A.L.I. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE §9-110 (1952) provides: "For purposes of this Article any 
description is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies the thing 
described." 
12 Tragar v. Jackson, 230 Minn. 544, 42 N.W. (2d) 16 (1950); Garmon v. Fitz-
gerald, 168 Miss. 532, 151 S. 726 (1934); 1 JoNEs, CHATTEL MoRTGAGEs AND CoNDI-
TIONAL SALES 94 (1933). 
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enable the mortgage to satisfy the "reasonable inquiry" test.13 When 
the chattel is unusually difficult to describe the court will often state 
that the mortgagee has done the best he could as a justification of a 
decision in favor of the mortgagee.14 Although many chattels do not 
have distinguishing serial numbers, the omission of such numbers 
where available may cause a court to find the description to be inade-
quate.15 It would seem that a careful mortgagee can meet the test of 
"reasonable inquiry" by including the following items in his mortgage: 
the number and a general description of the chattels, either the location, 
ownership or possession of the mortgaged property, and any serial 
numbers or other features peculiar to the chattel in question. 
IL Value of the Description Requirements in Light of the 
Scope of the Recording Acts 
While the legal standard of an effective description is fairly clear, 
the value of a description which measures up to this standard in im-
parting notice to third parties is questionable. Assuming that a third 
person can discover and examine a mortgage by searching the public 
records, the "reasonable inquiry" test would seem to provide a com-
mendable distribution of the burdens of identifying the mortgaged 
property. When a mortgage is executed containing information as to 
the location or possession of a chattel sufficient to meet the "reasonable 
inquiry" test, neither its validity nor its notice value is legally affected 
by a subsequent change in these facts.16 But when the mortgagor takes 
the mortgaged property out of the county in which the mortgage is 
13 The Westinghouse Co. v. McGrath, 131 Iowa 226, 108 N.W. 449 (1906); 
Everett v. Brown, 64 Iowa 420, 20 N.W. 743 (1884); Huse v. Estabrooks, 67 Vt. 223, 
31 A. 293 (1894); Hauseman Motor Co. v. Napierella, 223 Ky. 433, 3 S.W. (2d) 1084 
(1928). 
14Adamson v. Horton, 42 Minn. 161, 43 N.W. 849 (1889); B. M. Behrends Bank 
v. Satre, (D.C. Alaska 1953) 109 F. Supp. 917. 
15 Walker v. Fitzgerald, 157 Minn. 319, 196 N.W. 269 (1923); United States v. 
United Aircraft Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52; Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. 
v. Robertson, (6th Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 619. 
16 B. M. Behrends Bank v. Satre, (D.C. Alaska 1953) 109 F. Supp. 917; Adamson 
v. Horton, 42 Minn. 161, 43 N.W. 849 (1889). A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 
§9-401(3) (1952) provides: "A filing which is made in the proper place in this state 
remains effective even though the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of 
the collateral is thereafter changed [Alternative provision: a filing which is made in the 
proper county in this state remains effective for one hundred and twenty days after the 
debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collateral is changed to another 
county of this state but becomes ineffective thereafter unless a copy of the financing state-
ment signed by the secured party is filed in the new county within said period.]" Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A, §9-401(3) is an adoption of this alternative provision. 
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recorded, a search of the records of the county in which the chattel is 
now located would prove to be a fruitless task. A description, no matter 
how detailed and accurate, would be of no value in such a case. And 
if, for example, the mortgagor sells the property to one who is not 
aware of the mortgagee's interest in the chattel, a search of the record 
for mortgages of that subsequent purchaser by one with whom he is 
dealing would not reveal the existence of the encumbrance on the 
chattel. Thus in many instances a third person will be unable to dis-
cover the existence of the mortgage, let alone try to identify the mort-
gaged property; yet he is charged with constructive notice of the mort-
gagee's interest in the chattel. It appears that the law leaves something 
to be desired, not so much in its description requirements, but in the 
scope of the recording acts. 
III. Alternative Security Devices 
It would seem that creditors should be encouraged, if only by a 
stricter application of the "reasonable inquiry" test, to use a security 
device which not only is satisfactory from the creditor's viewpoint, but 
which overcomes the notice complications existent in the present chat-
tel mortgage law. 
A. The Pledge. The usefulness of the pledge is greatly limited 
by the requirement that the pledgee have possession of the pledged 
chattel or lose his security interest;17 this has been pointed to as a prin-
cipal factor in the development of the chattel mortgage.18 Functional 
limitations would seem to negate any notice advantages to be gained 
through the greater use of the pledge. 
B. Conditional Sales Contracts. Although the conditional sale 
seems to be satisfactory from the creditor's point of view, it appears to 
have no advantage over the purchase money chattel mortgage in sup-
plying notice to subsequent purchasers. The conditional sales contract 
is recorded on a town or county basis19 and the "reasonable inquiry" 
test is used to determine the adequacy of a conditional sales contract 
property description. 20 
17BRoWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §135 (1936). 
181 DURFEE, CASES ON SECURITY 486 (1951). 
19 2 U.L.A. IO (1922) states that twenty-three states require recording on a county-
wide basis while seven states provide for recording in the office of the town clerk. 2 U .L.A. 
44 (1953 Supp.) indicates that since the original compilation two additional states provide 
for county-wide recording while a third has changed from town to county recording. 
20National Cash Register Co. v. Marks, (6th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 628; Trusco 
Finance Co. v. Childs, 87 Ga. App. 789, 75 S.E. (2d) 336 (1953); CIT Corp. v. De-
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C. The Trust Receipt. The trust receipt is not advantageous in 
the single transaction situation where one or a few chattels are used as 
security.21 The entruster cannot proceed against one who, without 
actual notice of the limitations on the trustee's power of sale, purchases 
from the trustee. 22 The chattel mortgagee, on the other hand, may 
bring an action not only against the debtor but also against those taking 
possession from the debtor.23 
Considering both the value of the security device to the creditor 
and its features as a provider of notice to third parties, it appears that 
at the present time no security device superior to the chattel mortgage 
is available for use in the situation under discussion. 
IV. Improving the Chattel Mortgage 
Since there is an apparent lack of satisfactory substitutes for the 
chattel mortgage, improvements on that device might well be in order. 
It has been pointed out above that the narrow scope of operation of 
common recording acts denies to the creditor any real assurance that 
the chattel will not be moved to a new location and there be sold. 
Various attempts have been made to broaden the scope of the recording 
acts while still retaining a fundamentally county-wide system. Many 
statutes require that the mortgage be recorded in the county in which 
the mortgagor resides if he is a resident of the state when the mortgage 
is executed.24 The quite obvious purpose of this requirement is to 
protect third parties dealing with the mortgagor after he has carried 
the mortgaged property out of the county in which the mortgage was 
executed. Other statutes require a recording of the mortgage in the 
county where the property is located when the mortgage is executed. 25 
At least one state also requires that if the property is moved out of the 
Graff Lumber Co., 194 Minn. 169, 259 N.W. 807 (1935). Cf. Burroughs Adding Mach. 
Co. v. Robertson, (6th Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 619. 
219A U.L.A. 314 (1951) states: "This act shall not apply to single transactions of 
legal or equitable pledge, not constituting a course of business, whether such transactions 
be unaccompanied by delivery of possession, or involve constructive delivery, or delivery 
and redelivery, actual or constructive, so far as such transactions involve only an entruster 
who is an individual natural person, and a trustee entrusted as a fiduciary with handling 
investments or finances of the entruster. • . ." 
22 9A U.L.A. 304 (1951). 
23 Neece v. Guerin, 210 Ark. 954, 198 S.W. (2d) 161 (1946); Tragar v. Jackson, 
230 Minn. 544, 42 N.W. (2d) 16 (1950); Smith & Co. v. McLean, 24 Iowa 322 (1868); 
United States v. United Aircraft Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52. 
24 ill. Stat. Ann. (1950) c. 95, §4; Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §556.3; Mich. Comp. Laws 
(1948) §566.140; 32 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §232; Ohio Rev. Code 
(Baldwin, 1953) §1319.02. 
25 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §2957; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140. 
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county within a reasonable time thereafter the mortgage must be record-
ed in the county to which the property is removed.26 Where this is the 
state of the law, a search of the records of the county in which the chattel 
is located will reveal the mortgage in most cases where the mortgagor 
is in possession of the chattel. To strengthen the overall system, civil27 
and criminal28 penalties have been applied to persons disposing of the 
mortgaged property without informing the transferee of the encum-
brance thereon. While various combinations of these scope-widening 
provisions have been utilized, it would seem that a much better method 
of broadening the scope of the recording acts is available. Suggesting 
that a title certificate system similar to that used for automobiles be used 
for every chattel would seem to present the best solution to the notice 
problem, but such a system is obviously impractical. Congress indicated 
a possible solution when it provided that all aircraft mortgages be 
recorded in Washington, D. C.29 thereby enabling one dealing with 
the possessor of an airplane to ascertain whether or not that person has 
mortgaged the property. This might be effective in the case of a par-
ticular chattel, but the administrative burden would probably prevent 
utilizing this system for all chattel mortgages. Yet it would seem that 
a state-wide recording system may well be the answer to many of the 
problems inherent in the present system ~nd would nullify many of 
the complications caused by the mobility of chattels.30 Under such a 
26 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §2957; A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL Coo:a 
§9-401(3) (1952) (alternate provision). 
21 ID. Stat. Ann. (1950) c. 95, §6. 
28 Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1949) §538; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §2151; Ohio 
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §1319.18. Here the description must be sufficient to meet 
only the test of validity between the parties. Albritton v. State, (Miss. 1951) 52 S. 
(2d) 608; State v. Murphy, 214 S.C. 517, 53 S.E. (2d) 402 (1949). 
20 62 Stat. L. 494 (1948), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §523. United States v. United Air- · 
craft Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52, represents an application of the "reason-
able inquiry" test under this statute. 
ao A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMI!RCIAL Coo:a §9-401 (1952), provides: "(I) If filing is 
required by this Article (subsection (1) of Section 9-302) in order to perfect a security 
interest, the place of filing is as follows: (a) when the collateral is accounts other than 
those arising from the sale of farm products by a farmer, chattel paper, contract rights, 
inventory or equipment other than equipment used in farming operations, then in the 
office of the (Secretary of State) (and in addition if all of the debtor's places of business 
are in a single county, in the office of the •••• of that county); (b) when the collateral 
is consumer goods, equipment used in farming operations, farm products, or accounts arising 
from the sale of farm products by a farmer, then ••• in the county of the debtor's residence 
or if the debtor is not a resident of this State then • • • in the county where the goods are 
kept, and in addition when the collateral is crops • • • in the county where the land on 
which the crops are growing or to be grown is located." In its adoption of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Pennsylvania went a long way toward clarifying this provision. Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A, §9-401: "(l) If filing is required by this Article 
(subsection (1) of Section 9-302) in order to perfect a security interest, the place of 
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system one letter to the state office in which chattel mortgages are 
recorded would answer the question of whether or not a named person 
has mortgaged chattels and, if so, a copy of the mortgage or mortgages 
should be available to determine which chattels have been mortgaged. 
Of course, state-wide recording would not prevent unauthorized sales 
to third parties followed by further sales by such purchasers, nor would 
such recording solve problems arising from the movement of mort-
gaged chattels across state lines. But if civil and criminal sanctions for 
the disposition of mortgaged property without notifying the transferee 
of the encumbrance are added to a system of state-wide recording, 
some of the existing failures of the present recording system would 
be eliminated. A disadvantage of such a system would appear in the 
delay causecl in consummating transactions. However, where the trans-
action is such that one is willing to make an investigation as to encum-
brances, the disadvantage of delay would be outweighed by the element 
of safety introduced. While piecemeal legislation is no doubt valuable, 
the possibility of state-wide recording offers a comprehensive solution 
to the problem and should be seriously considered by the legislature of 
every state which has not enacted such a statute. 
Judson M. Werbelow, S.Ed. 
filing is as follows: (a) when the collateral is accounts other than those arising from 
the sale of farm products • • • or is chattel paper, contract rights, inventory or equipment 
other than equipment used in £arming operations, then in the office of the Secretary of 
Co=onwealth and in addition if all of the debtor's places of business are in a single 
county, in the office of the prothonotary of that county." Emphasis added. This section 
clearly provides for state-wide recording of chattel mortgages. 
